Hi, my name is Danny (pronounced "Donny" due to an acute case of Israeli heritage), and this is my first post on this board. I just wanted to debate the eighth podcast, which sets out to prove Libertarian morality. Here are my objections:
1) In the podcast, Stefan says that to say that there are no universally preferred behaviors is to imply that truth is universally preferred. However, this only demonstrates that the speaker prefers truth. Someone who does not argue with Stefan, but does not agree either, has not contradicted herself. Additionally, we might be instructed by looking at the Buddhist thinker Nagarjuna, who had a similar argument with an ancient Vedic school of logic called Nyaya (I wrote a paper on this last semester, I know it's cheesy to bring it up...sorry). He claimed that if he were taking the opposing position himself, his argument would be self defeating. However, because he was not taking such a position, but was only saying that his opponents' position was incorrect, no such error could be ascribed to him. In other words, we're not dealing with "A" vs "~A" here; we're dealing with "(for all x) Ax" vs "~(for all x) Ax." Accordingly, I can fulfill "A," and still show that "~(for all x) Ax" as long as there exists an x such that "~Ax".
2) In the podcast, Stefan says that preferred behaviors exist because existence implies purposeful action (this is not strictly true, because many organisms do not consciously prefer to act the way that they do, but rather operate in an explicitly deterministic fashion). But the existence of preferences does not imply that universally preferred behaviors exist. If I prefers eating spinach, and my friend finds doing so abhorrent, it can be said that we both display preferred behaviors, but that there is no universal preferred behavior with regard to eating spinach.
3) Stefan appeals to universality, but says that exceptions to rules do not disprove the rule. He cites the example in biology where a horse born with two heads can still be considered a horse. However, a little metaphysical analysis would surely show that horse-ness is not dependent upon having one head. The line which differentiates a horse from a non-horse may not exist, but so long as a two headed horse is still a horse, then it is obvious that we can not have strayed from any rule. It is clear there was never an "if x is a horse, then x has one head" imperative in the first place. Saying that horses generally have one head, but rare two headed horses exist, does not imply that horses should have one head; it is simply an observation. But since Stefan contradicts this stance mere moments later when he claims that soldiers ought not to murder, we can put this aside.
4) Stefan's attempts to prove Libertarian ideals like property rights at the end of his podcast carry in as assumptions that we already believe the moral propositions he is espousing. If I steal from you (which presupposes the existence of property rights, because taking only becomes stealing if you have a right to your things), who is to say that I am assuming that others won't try to do the same to me? I might build up a stockpile of weapons to ensure that no one can take from me what I've taken from others. This moral position would be a pretty objectionable one, but it's not inherently inconsistent.
5) Stefan's rape example holds pretty unlibertarian implications. He claims that rape is bad because it results in considerable displeasure for the victim, but this same argument could be made against painting one's house an obnoxious color or making light of one's controversial opinions. Many people would argue that these acts are certainly not bad, first among these libertarians.
To be clear, I'm a libertarian myself, and nothing would please me more than being able to prove morality. I just don't think it can be done, and I think this exposition falls short.