Freedomain Radio

I remember Stef saying in a podcast long ago that the free will vs. determinism debate was a question to be solved by science and not by philosophy.

This is a fairly old study, but http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2008/04/mind_decision

It seems odd that, if you are involved in a project that is mentally "demanding", like solving hard mathematical problems, or just becoming better at something that you are currently bad at (like as in my case, despite having studied a bit on the subject, becoming a better cook) it would have something free will-ish about it.

On the other hand, if you are abused as a child, you seem to be bound by "determinist forces" to repeat some of your negative behaviours, but I'd say that it still feels like free will might be involved in questions like important life decisions or heavy mental tasks.

What are your thoughts?

repka:

I remember Stef saying in a podcast long ago that the free will vs. determinism debate was a question to be solved by science and not by philosophy.

This is a fairly old study, but http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2008/04/mind_decision

It seems odd that, if you are involved in a project that is mentally "demanding", like solving hard mathematical problems, or just becoming better at something that you are currently bad at (like as in my case, despite having studied a bit on the subject, becoming a better cook) it would have something free will-ish about it.

On the other hand, if you are abused as a child, you seem to be bound by "determinist forces" to repeat some of your negative behaviours, but I'd say that it still feels like free will might be involved in questions like important life decisions or heavy mental tasks.

What are your thoughts?

I'm pretty sure everyone is aware of these kinds of studies. The test is extremely superficial. I accept the free-will position but I doubt there's much if any free-will in the decisions made in pushing buttons. 

Some people have this notion of free-will that every decision must start from some uncaused centre. I'd guess most of our decisions are determined. But we don't know how choice works. Some choices take place over years. This study only really has something to say about moments of decisions. 

 Somewhere between determinism and pure random behavior is action that has strong probabilistic likelihoods and "overwhelming structure". 

We can imagine that a loaded die will prefer certain outcomes.  It's not determined, nor is it fully random.  You can also imagine two dice loaded with weak specially-aligned magnets, and the dice are thrown high but constrained by a large funnel so they land in a tiny cup.  Each number 1-6 on each die may occur equally often, but the dice will "agree" with each other more often than chance alone would dictate.  If the magnets are strong enough, the dice may always agree.  But each single number on a die is equally likely (the two dice are now acting statistically as one).

You can imagine many millions of dice behaving in very structured, but still indeterminate ways.  I think we can behave deterministically, but that is still a non-deterministic choice.  Without such choices we would not make sense of the world.  There is an element of determinism (call it D), an element of randomness (call it R).  Together in appropriate mixture, a structure called "free will" (F=D+R) emerges.  I call this theory FDR.

self-knowledge is freedom, determinism is avoidance

I think "free will" is more of an artifact of the fundamental incompleteness/inconsistency of reality and our limited ability to predict our own behavior. Even though epistemologically we all have unlimited access to all of our cognitive resources all of the time, we are equally capable of inhibiting our own function, and thus we can unconsciously take away our own choices without consciously having any choice in the matter, if that makes sense.

Furthermore, the types of situations and experiences which either free us to have more choices or take them away have at least a considerable deterministic component to them.

Ultimately, I'd say that we "have free will" in the sense that we can produce spontaneous behavior, and in the sense that our evolution is not a completely straightforward mechanistic reductive process (ie natural selection), but also involves internally self-ordering processes which generate the underlying form. Not, however, in the sense of unconditionally unlimited choice.

Richard P. Feynman:

One day, two or three of the young rabbis came to me and said, "We realize that
we can't study to be rabbis in the modern world without knowing something about
science, so we'd like to ask you some questions."

Of course there are thousands of places to find out about science, and Columbia University was right near there, but I wanted to know what kinds of questions they were interested in.

They said, "Well, for instance, is electricity fire?"

"No," I said, "but. . . what is the problem?"

They said, "In the Talmud it says you're not supposed to make fire on a Saturday,
so our question is, can we use electrical things on Saturdays?"

I was shocked. They weren't interested in science at all! The only way science
was influencing their lives was so they might be able to interpret better the Talmud! They
weren't interested in the world outside, in natural phenomena; they were only interested
in resolving some question brought up in the Talmud.

Stefan Molyneux:

self-knowledge is freedom, determinism is avoidance

Could you explain what you mean by "determinism" here?  Because I would say something rather the opposite:

Seeking to understand the true nature of the universe aids (self-)knowledge; cloaking it in obscure words (for example, "free will" and perhaps "determinism" in the sense that you're using it) impedes knowledge.

All evidence points to the fact that we live in a physically deterministic universe; science has found no evidence to the contrary (as far as I know anyway -- if anyone knows of any findings to the contrary, I'd love to see them!)

In programming, anyway, there are several modes of "determinism". A semi-determinate procedure succeeds at most once, a determinate procedure succeeds exactly once, a multideterminate procedure succeeds more than once and a non-determinate procedure succeeds an unspecifiable amount of times.

As for physical determinism, the general idea is that, if you knew the state and position of every particle in the universe at any given moment, then you could predict the state and position of every particle in the future. Of course, that is physically impossible, but it also requires that given the universal state, each particle interaction would only have one outcome (otherwise you could not predict the future determinately, only statistically).  However, experiments with relativity seem to have demonstrated conclusively that more than one outcome occurs, and that different outcomes occur simultaneously given different frames of reference.

So, while the universe certainly displays deterministic characteristics, it is most likely only partly deterministic and partly non-deterministic, the latter creating variations in the former.

I'd like to add a personal spin to the topic.  For this I'd like to break out of the "free will vs. determinism" dichotomy (i.e. "Are you on the side of free will or determinism?") because I find it supremely misleading.

My life has greatly improved as I have gained an understanding of cognitive psychology, which itself rests firmly on a framework of physical determinism.  I have come to understand the brain not as a black box that has "thoughts" and "desires" and stuff, but as a piece of physical machinery that (along with the rest of the body) gives rise to all of one's thoughts and actions.

I don't like the concept of "willpower" because it suggests that it should be easy to will yourself to change your behaviour.  I've struggled with various nervous habits my whole life, and back before I knew much about psychology, I would feel guilty for being unable to just make myself stop doing something I didn't want to be doing.  What has helped me greatly is understanding that it is not just my high-level conscious thoughts and desires (which are themselves completely physically underlied, as far as we know) which go into directing my behaviour, but also low-level unconscious processes and physical pathways.  To change these takes significant work (see: CBT).  The brain is a massively parallel information processor, and it interacts with itself and external stimuli in extremely complex ways.  This is where determinism and (external) predictability sharply diverge.  I find real, scientifically-grounded psychology fascinating to think about, and immensely helpful practically speaking.

I think what I've said above jibes both with "free-will" as Stef talks about it, and physical determinism as I understand it.  Hence why I find pitting the two against each other to be misleading and unhelpful.

Haplo:

As for physical determinism, the general idea is that, if you knew the state and position of every particle in the universe at any given moment, then you could predict the state and position of every particle in the future. Of course, that is physically impossible, but it also requires that given the universal state, each particle interaction would only have one outcome (otherwise you could not predict the future determinately, only statistically).  However, experiments with relativity seem to have demonstrated conclusively that more than one outcome occurs, and that different outcomes occur simultaneously given different frames of reference.

 

So, while the universe certainly displays deterministic characteristics, it is most likely only partly deterministic and partly non-deterministic, the latter creating variations in the former.

As interesting as quantum mechanics sounds, I've been unable to extract any practical implications from it. Its descriptions of the "probabilistic" nature of electron positions and so on sound more like an attempt to model reality in a way that we can work with, than an attempt to completely accurately describe reality (i.e. we're missing part of the picture, and if we had it, reality would again look deterministic at the quantum level).  Perhaps Metric can say more about this, since it's not my area of expertise.

Annabelle:

Haplo:

As for physical determinism, the general idea is that, if you knew the state and position of every particle in the universe at any given moment, then you could predict the state and position of every particle in the future. Of course, that is physically impossible, but it also requires that given the universal state, each particle interaction would only have one outcome (otherwise you could not predict the future determinately, only statistically).  However, experiments with relativity seem to have demonstrated conclusively that more than one outcome occurs, and that different outcomes occur simultaneously given different frames of reference.

 

So, while the universe certainly displays deterministic characteristics, it is most likely only partly deterministic and partly non-deterministic, the latter creating variations in the former.

As interesting as quantum mechanics sounds, I've been unable to extract any practical implications from it. Its descriptions of the "probabilistic" nature of electron positions and so on sound more like an attempt to model reality in a way that we can work with, than an attempt to completely accurately describe reality (i.e. we're missing part of the picture, and if we had it, reality would again look deterministic at the quantum level).  Perhaps Metric can say more about this, since it's not my area of expertise.

Hi Annabelle,

You're completely right about the probabilities appearing in QM.  It is one of the basic postulates of QM that "closed systems" evolve deterministically, and this holds up experimentally whenever you test it with sufficient care.  The probabilities show up because the measurement process involves a process called "decoherence," which amounts to what you were saying above -- loss of access to complete information.  This shouldn't be thought of as a "fudge factor" though -- any being, no matter how technologically sophisticated, will encounter the same probabilities.  It is a fundamental consequence of the observer being a part of the universe himself.

Also, I should point out that the "different frames of reference" appearing in relativity don't change this situation -- they just amount to different ways of describing the same physical process.

Metric:

Hi Annabelle,

You're completely right about the probabilities appearing in QM.  It is one of the basic postulates of QM that "closed systems" evolve deterministically, and this holds up experimentally whenever you test it with sufficient care.  The probabilities show up because the measurement process involves a process called "decoherence," which amounts to what you were saying above -- loss of access to complete information.  This shouldn't be thought of as a "fudge factor" though -- any being, no matter how technologically sophisticated, will encounter the same probabilities.  It is a fundamental consequence of the observer being a part of the universe himself.

Also, I should point out that the "different frames of reference" appearing in relativity don't change this situation -- they just amount to different ways of describing the same physical process.

Ahh, new word for me.  I think the wikipedia page on decoherence shall be my bedtime reading tonight.  Thanks!

Annabelle:

Metric:

Hi Annabelle,

You're completely right about the probabilities appearing in QM.  It is one of the basic postulates of QM that "closed systems" evolve deterministically, and this holds up experimentally whenever you test it with sufficient care.  The probabilities show up because the measurement process involves a process called "decoherence," which amounts to what you were saying above -- loss of access to complete information.  This shouldn't be thought of as a "fudge factor" though -- any being, no matter how technologically sophisticated, will encounter the same probabilities.  It is a fundamental consequence of the observer being a part of the universe himself.

Also, I should point out that the "different frames of reference" appearing in relativity don't change this situation -- they just amount to different ways of describing the same physical process.

Ahh, new word for me.  I think the wikipedia page on decoherence shall be my bedtime reading tonight.  Thanks!

Unfortunately, the wikipedia page on decoherence may torture you without much payoff.  Decoherence is a bigger subject than just the measurement problem, and it's difficult to tease out the essential parts you are looking for, from that wiki page.

The decoherence picture is closely related to the many-worlds interpretation of QM, though, so you might get more out of the following wiki page:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation#Properties_of_the_theory

Metric:

Hi Annabelle,

You're completely right about the probabilities appearing in QM.  It is one of the basic postulates of QM that "closed systems" evolve deterministically, and this holds up experimentally whenever you test it with sufficient care.  The probabilities show up because the measurement process involves a process called "decoherence," which amounts to what you were saying above -- loss of access to complete information.  This shouldn't be thought of as a "fudge factor" though -- any being, no matter how technologically sophisticated, will encounter the same probabilities.  It is a fundamental consequence of the observer being a part of the universe himself.

Also, I should point out that the "different frames of reference" appearing in relativity don't change this situation -- they just amount to different ways of describing the same physical process.

Ah, but the problem is the irreversible nature of the measurement operation, which not only applies to measurement but also to other particle interactions. However that alone doesn't prove non-determinism. The fact that the probabilities are the same in every instance proves that it is somewhat repeatable, but the fact that they are probabilities and not constants implies that the same interaction with the same known variables can produce different outcomes.

Of course, the deterministic argument goes something like "well, there are variables which we don't know about that exist on a smaller scale", but that leads to the question "Is there an absolute smallest scale or is the universe recursive?". If there is an absolute smallest scale, then determinism holds, and if there is not, then semi-determinism is more accurate.

Metric:

Unfortunately, the wikipedia page on decoherence may torture you without much payoff.  Decoherence is a bigger subject than just the measurement problem, and it's difficult to tease out the essential parts you are looking for, from that wiki page.

The decoherence picture is closely related to the many-worlds interpretation of QM, though, so you might get more out of the following wiki page:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation#Properties_of_the_theory

That's what I was referring to originally, although I think I mixed up non-linearity with non-determinism, although they are related.

Annabelle:

I'd like to add a personal spin to the topic.  For this I'd like to break out of the "free will vs. determinism" dichotomy (i.e. "Are you on the side of free will or determinism?") because I find it supremely misleading.

My life has greatly improved as I have gained an understanding of cognitive psychology, which itself rests firmly on a framework of physical determinism.  I have come to understand the brain not as a black box that has "thoughts" and "desires" and stuff, but as a piece of physical machinery that (along with the rest of the body) gives rise to all of one's thoughts and actions.

I don't like the concept of "willpower" because it suggests that it should be easy to will yourself to change your behaviour.  I've struggled with various nervous habits my whole life, and back before I knew much about psychology, I would feel guilty for being unable to just make myself stop doing something I didn't want to be doing.  What has helped me greatly is understanding that it is not just my high-level conscious thoughts and desires (which are themselves completely physically underlied, as far as we know) which go into directing my behaviour, but also low-level unconscious processes and physical pathways.  To change these takes significant work (see: CBT).  The brain is a massively parallel information processor, and it interacts with itself and external stimuli in extremely complex ways.  This is where determinism and (external) predictability sharply diverge.  I find real, scientifically-grounded psychology fascinating to think about, and immensely helpful practically speaking.

I think what I've said above jibes both with "free-will" as Stef talks about it, and physical determinism as I understand it.  Hence why I find pitting the two against each other to be misleading and unhelpful.

I agree that psychology is a more appropriate frame with which to approach this issue, since it's more about brain function than epistemology. Have you ever heard of or studied Milton Erickson?

Metric:

Unfortunately, the wikipedia page on decoherence may torture you without much payoff.  Decoherence is a bigger subject than just the measurement problem, and it's difficult to tease out the essential parts you are looking for, from that wiki page.

The decoherence picture is closely related to the many-worlds interpretation of QM, though, so you might get more out of the following wiki page:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation#Properties_of_the_theory

Ok, shall start with that!

Haplo:

I agree that psychology is a more appropriate frame with which to approach this issue, since it's more about brain function than epistemology. Have you ever heard of or studied Milton Erickson?

No, I hadn't heard of him before now.  I'm more interested in cognitive neuroscience than therapy, to be honest.  I'm sure there are notable exceptions, but I find that the latter has a propensity to lose its grounding in reality.  Now, this in itself is interesting to study, as is religion, but I haven't found a whole lot in it that has helped me personally.  Cognitive neuroscience (and science in general) can struggle with conformance to reality as well, but they also have built-in methods for dealing with it.  Anyway, I would say that my understanding of psychology has been influenced by the work of Gazzaniga (despairingly short wikipedia page for such a fascinating researcher), Ramachandran, and Baron-Cohen (yes, cousin of Borat!), among many others.