Freedomain Radio

This question is regarding the book "A Theory of Justice" by John Rawls.  I'm not really looking for answers but just look at the question itself, I need help handling stuff like this in an academic environment.

"The “priority of the right over the good” emerges as one of the central features of Rawls’ completed theory. How is this concept rooted in the serial ordering of the two principles and what role does it play in shaping any “thick” theory of the good which might come into being after the veil of ignorance is lifted?"

Rawls' theory explains "the right" and "the good" as different concepts which can be prioritized.  This priority is then supposedly rooted in Rawls' two principles, 1. the liberty principle and 2. the difference principle.

Then the "thick" theory of the good is supposed to be one's conception of their ideal "purposes" and how they will achieve them.  The veil of ignorance is a thought experiment where you attempt to envision the outcome of a vote between mutually disinterested "rational" human beings who wish to "form a contract" as their basis of society.  The principles laid out in the contract are what Rawls calls the principles of justice.

Frankly, I'm so sick of digging through such sophisticated bullcrap.  I'm a sophomore at university and I'm majoring in philosophy because I feel the calling to spread reason as much as I possibly can.  What can I do in a situation where I'm getting thrown questions that come from so far down the rabbit hole that I can't even really question the premises without completely ignoring or denying the questions or topics at hand.  It's actually quite stressful to sit through some of the lectures where the professors are constantly in your face asking questions and demanding group participation.  I can't ever seem to get a firm foothold for questioning or even identifying some of the false assumptions that fuel ideas like "thick theories of the good" and "the difference principle" and really far out abstractions like that.  Any help would be greatly appreciated.

What's his definition of "the right" and "the good"?

What does it mean for a theory to be "thick"?

aelephant:

What's his definition of "the right" and "the good"?

What does it mean for a theory to be "thick"?

I think that the right has to do with the two principles of justice laid down in his "Original Position" where "unbiased rational voters" create a contract to form society.

This is what he is basing justice off of.  And I mentioned the thick theory of the good in the OP. It is not making much sense to me either.

Sounds like BS to me

huttnedu:

The veil of ignorance is a thought experiment where you attempt to envision the outcome of a vote between mutually disinterested "rational" human beings who wish to "form a contract" as their basis of society.  The principles laid out in the contract are what Rawls calls the principles of justice.

I liked this bit especially since ethics are only a subjective opinion, a conclusion which I base on no one seemingly having a proof as a matter of fact on the contrary. In fact as I explain in this thread I think voluntary contracts between individuals are the only way that I can see to move towards a voluntary society based on facts not just opinions(rights, morals) on how people should behave towards one another.

huttnedu:

aelephant:

What's his definition of "the right" and "the good"?

What does it mean for a theory to be "thick"?

I think that the right has to do with the two principles of justice laid down in his "Original Position" where "unbiased rational voters" create a contract to form society.

This is what he is basing justice off of.  And I mentioned the thick theory of the good in the OP. It is not making much sense to me either.

 

Wikipedia:

The First Principle of Justice

“

First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.

”

The basic liberties of citizens are, the political liberty to vote and run for office, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom of personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest. However, he says:

liberties not on the list, for example, the right to own certain kinds of property (e.g. means of production) and freedom of contract as understood by the doctrine of laissez-faire are not basic; and so they are not protected by the priority of the first principle.

The first principle may not be violated, even for the sake of the second principle, above an unspecified but low level of economic development. However, because various basic liberties may conflict, it may be necessary to trade them off against each other for the sake of obtaining the largest possible system of rights. There is thus some uncertainty as to exactly what is mandated by the principle, and it is possible that a plurality of sets of liberties satisfy its requirements.

The Second Principle of Justice

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that (Rawls, 1971, p.303; revised edition, p. 47): (a) they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).(b) offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity

Rawls' claim in (a) is that departures from equality of a list of what he calls primary goods—"things which a rational man wants whatever else he wants" [Rawls, 1971, pg. 92]—are justified only to the extent that they improve the lot of those who are worst-off under that distribution in comparison with the previous, equal, distribution. His position is at least in some sense egalitarian, with a proviso that equality is not to be achieved by worsening the position of the least advantaged. An important consequence here, however, is that inequalities can actually be just on Rawls' view, as long as they are to the benefit of the least well off. His argument for this position rests heavily on the claim that morally arbitrary factors (for example, the family one is born into) shouldn't determine one's life chances or opportunities. Rawls is also keying on an intuition that a person does not morally deserve their inborn talents; thus that one is not entitled to all the benefits they could possibly receive from them; hence, at least one of the criteria which could provide an alternative to equality in assessing the justice of distributions is eliminated.

The stipulation in (b) is lexically prior to that in (a). Fair equality of opportunity requires not merely that offices and positions are distributed on the basis of merit, but that all have reasonable opportunity to acquire the skills on the basis of which merit is assessed. It may be thought that this stipulation, and even the first principle of justice, may require greater equality than the difference principle, because large social and economic inequalities, even when they are to the advantage of the worst-off, will tend to seriously undermine the value of the political liberties and any measures towards fair equality of opportunity.

In the 1st part he assumes into existence government, doesn't he? Why must people have a right to vote and run for office? In fact, why must office exist at all?

In the 2nd part, I question why he thinks people do not "deserve" their inborn talents? What does that even mean?

aelephant:

huttnedu:

aelephant:

What's his definition of "the right" and "the good"?

What does it mean for a theory to be "thick"?

I think that the right has to do with the two principles of justice laid down in his "Original Position" where "unbiased rational voters" create a contract to form society.

This is what he is basing justice off of.  And I mentioned the thick theory of the good in the OP. It is not making much sense to me either.

 

Wikipedia:

The First Principle of Justice

“

First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.

”

The basic liberties of citizens are, the political liberty to vote and run for office, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom of personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest. However, he says:

liberties not on the list, for example, the right to own certain kinds of property (e.g. means of production) and freedom of contract as understood by the doctrine of laissez-faire are not basic; and so they are not protected by the priority of the first principle.

The first principle may not be violated, even for the sake of the second principle, above an unspecified but low level of economic development. However, because various basic liberties may conflict, it may be necessary to trade them off against each other for the sake of obtaining the largest possible system of rights. There is thus some uncertainty as to exactly what is mandated by the principle, and it is possible that a plurality of sets of liberties satisfy its requirements.

The Second Principle of Justice

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that (Rawls, 1971, p.303; revised edition, p. 47): (a) they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).(b) offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity

Rawls' claim in (a) is that departures from equality of a list of what he calls primary goods—"things which a rational man wants whatever else he wants" [Rawls, 1971, pg. 92]—are justified only to the extent that they improve the lot of those who are worst-off under that distribution in comparison with the previous, equal, distribution. His position is at least in some sense egalitarian, with a proviso that equality is not to be achieved by worsening the position of the least advantaged. An important consequence here, however, is that inequalities can actually be just on Rawls' view, as long as they are to the benefit of the least well off. His argument for this position rests heavily on the claim that morally arbitrary factors (for example, the family one is born into) shouldn't determine one's life chances or opportunities. Rawls is also keying on an intuition that a person does not morally deserve their inborn talents; thus that one is not entitled to all the benefits they could possibly receive from them; hence, at least one of the criteria which could provide an alternative to equality in assessing the justice of distributions is eliminated.

The stipulation in (b) is lexically prior to that in (a). Fair equality of opportunity requires not merely that offices and positions are distributed on the basis of merit, but that all have reasonable opportunity to acquire the skills on the basis of which merit is assessed. It may be thought that this stipulation, and even the first principle of justice, may require greater equality than the difference principle, because large social and economic inequalities, even when they are to the advantage of the worst-off, will tend to seriously undermine the value of the political liberties and any measures towards fair equality of opportunity.

In the 1st part he assumes into existence government, doesn't he? Why must people have a right to vote and run for office? In fact, why must office exist at all?

In the 2nd part, I question why he thinks people do not "deserve" their inborn talents? What does that even mean?

 

So, in other words:

 

Haplo:

aelephant:

huttnedu:

aelephant:

What's his definition of "the right" and "the good"?

What does it mean for a theory to be "thick"?

I think that the right has to do with the two principles of justice laid down in his "Original Position" where "unbiased rational voters" create a contract to form society.

This is what he is basing justice off of.  And I mentioned the thick theory of the good in the OP. It is not making much sense to me either.

 

Wikipedia:

The First Principle of Justice

“

First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.

”

The basic liberties of citizens are, the political liberty to vote and run for office, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom of personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest. However, he says:

liberties not on the list, for example, the right to own certain kinds of property (e.g. means of production) and freedom of contract as understood by the doctrine of laissez-faire are not basic; and so they are not protected by the priority of the first principle.

The first principle may not be violated, even for the sake of the second principle, above an unspecified but low level of economic development. However, because various basic liberties may conflict, it may be necessary to trade them off against each other for the sake of obtaining the largest possible system of rights. There is thus some uncertainty as to exactly what is mandated by the principle, and it is possible that a plurality of sets of liberties satisfy its requirements.

The Second Principle of Justice

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that (Rawls, 1971, p.303; revised edition, p. 47): (a) they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).(b) offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity

Rawls' claim in (a) is that departures from equality of a list of what he calls primary goods—"things which a rational man wants whatever else he wants" [Rawls, 1971, pg. 92]—are justified only to the extent that they improve the lot of those who are worst-off under that distribution in comparison with the previous, equal, distribution. His position is at least in some sense egalitarian, with a proviso that equality is not to be achieved by worsening the position of the least advantaged. An important consequence here, however, is that inequalities can actually be just on Rawls' view, as long as they are to the benefit of the least well off. His argument for this position rests heavily on the claim that morally arbitrary factors (for example, the family one is born into) shouldn't determine one's life chances or opportunities. Rawls is also keying on an intuition that a person does not morally deserve their inborn talents; thus that one is not entitled to all the benefits they could possibly receive from them; hence, at least one of the criteria which could provide an alternative to equality in assessing the justice of distributions is eliminated.

The stipulation in (b) is lexically prior to that in (a). Fair equality of opportunity requires not merely that offices and positions are distributed on the basis of merit, but that all have reasonable opportunity to acquire the skills on the basis of which merit is assessed. It may be thought that this stipulation, and even the first principle of justice, may require greater equality than the difference principle, because large social and economic inequalities, even when they are to the advantage of the worst-off, will tend to seriously undermine the value of the political liberties and any measures towards fair equality of opportunity.

In the 1st part he assumes into existence government, doesn't he? Why must people have a right to vote and run for office? In fact, why must office exist at all?

In the 2nd part, I question why he thinks people do not "deserve" their inborn talents? What does that even mean?

 

So, in other words:

 

  Not quite, Rawls' theory allows for the possibility of entrepeneurship, trade and wealth accumulation.  For instance if the most disadvantaged people were children of the working poor and industrialisation meant that they could have the ability to pay for education, leave their possibly abusive parents earlier etc. then the wealth accumulation that both enables and results from industrialisation would be OK, even if it mean wealth was more unequal.

  In regard to "deserving" one's innate talents he means that you did not do anything to earn innate talents and therefore the benefits of them are not earned.  Therefore by his terms you don't deserve them.  While I can see his point here, nobody else deserves them either. Suppose that you are born with the great mathematical talent that allows you to improve aircraft feul efficiency by 2% with minimal extra expense and weight.  Suppose you work at that and during or after you do you argue that you deserve more than standard wages because your talent makes your work more valuable.  Rawls would say that you didn't create that talent so you don't deserve to get more for having it.  I would say that the beneficiaries of that talent didn't create it either and so don't deserve a free ride merely because they live on the same planet as a mathematical genius.  Therefore you're not obliged to use that talent and are entitled to set conditions on it's use like "Pay me lots of money".

Livemike:

Not quite, Rawls' theory allows for the possibility of entrepeneurship, trade and wealth accumulation.  For instance if the most disadvantaged people were children of the working poor and industrialisation meant that they could have the ability to pay for education, leave their possibly abusive parents earlier etc. then the wealth accumulation that both enables and results from industrialisation would be OK, even if it mean wealth was more unequal.

  In regard to "deserving" one's innate talents he means that you did not do anything to earn innate talents and therefore the benefits of them are not earned.  Therefore by his terms you don't deserve them.  While I can see his point here, nobody else deserves them either. Suppose that you are born with the great mathematical talent that allows you to improve aircraft feul efficiency by 2% with minimal extra expense and weight.  Suppose you work at that and during or after you do you argue that you deserve more than standard wages because your talent makes your work more valuable.  Rawls would say that you didn't create that talent so you don't deserve to get more for having it.  I would say that the beneficiaries of that talent didn't create it either and so don't deserve a free ride merely because they live on the same planet as a mathematical genius.  Therefore you're not obliged to use that talent and are entitled to set conditions on it's use like "Pay me lots of money"

 

Well, I agree with your point, but every time Rawls makes a point he draws upon many arbitrary, unproven assertions. When he defines "the first principle of justice" he assumes government without any justification. When he goes on to define "the second principle of justice", he begins with equality of opportunity and then immediately launches into a promotion of equality of outcome, both contradictory and unjustified. Then he finishes it off with justifications about how people "don't deserve their inborn talents", yet doesn't justify why anyone else should deserve them either.

 

Although he states that "the right" (liberty) takes precedence over "the good" (socialism), his work clearly leans towards socialism and is definitely being used as propaganda in a public school course, by some sophist professor who likes feeling more important than students (and probably doesn't mind his pension, either). Just consider the original question for a moment, notice how foggy and suggestive the language is, and perhaps you'll see what I mean.

 

I hope that also answers the OP's question :P.

I found this regarding "thin vs. thick" but I am still not too clear what it means:

Ethics, political philosophy for Rawls, primary goods are essential for pursuing any rational plan of life and are used to determine a thin conception of the good . A thin theory of the good explains why these primary goods are what any rational person would desire and it also gives insight into the notion of rationality that leads from these goods to the choice of principles of justice . Such an account is necessary to understand the motives and choices of participants in the original position . Once principles of justice are derived from the original position, we may develop a full conception of the good and therefore a full theory of the good. “We need what I have called the thin theory of the good to explain the rational preference for primary goods and to explicate the notion of rationality underlying the choice of principles in the original position.”

Trying to interpret this:

Primary goods are used to develop a thin theory of the good, then the thin theory is used to derive principles of justice. The thick theory of the good is finally derived from the thin theory and the principles of justice together.

To me, this begs the question, what are the primary goods?

From Wikipedia:

Wikipedia:

Primary goods are subdivided in two categories:

• Natural primary goods: this category includes intelligence, imagination, health, etc.
• Social primary goods: this category includes rights (civil rights, political rights, ... ), liberties, income and wealth, the social bases of self respect, etc.

Do you actually have the book? Where does he dream these up? They seem random and there's no justification given for them.

What about the right to healthcare or the right to own a cellphone?

these qoutes look like a badly mistraslated marxist pamphlet.

Pure Po-Mo...

Haplo:

Livemike:

Not quite, Rawls' theory allows for the possibility of entrepeneurship, trade and wealth accumulation.  For instance if the most disadvantaged people were children of the working poor and industrialisation meant that they could have the ability to pay for education, leave their possibly abusive parents earlier etc. then the wealth accumulation that both enables and results from industrialisation would be OK, even if it mean wealth was more unequal.

  In regard to "deserving" one's innate talents he means that you did not do anything to earn innate talents and therefore the benefits of them are not earned.  Therefore by his terms you don't deserve them.  While I can see his point here, nobody else deserves them either. Suppose that you are born with the great mathematical talent that allows you to improve aircraft feul efficiency by 2% with minimal extra expense and weight.  Suppose you work at that and during or after you do you argue that you deserve more than standard wages because your talent makes your work more valuable.  Rawls would say that you didn't create that talent so you don't deserve to get more for having it.  I would say that the beneficiaries of that talent didn't create it either and so don't deserve a free ride merely because they live on the same planet as a mathematical genius.  Therefore you're not obliged to use that talent and are entitled to set conditions on it's use like "Pay me lots of money"

 Well, I agree with your point, but every time Rawls makes a point he draws upon many arbitrary, unproven assertions. When he defines "the first principle of justice" he assumes government without any justification. When he goes on to define "the second principle of justice", he begins with equality of opportunity and then immediately launches into a promotion of equality of outcome, both contradictory and unjustified. Then he finishes it off with justifications about how people "don't deserve their inborn talents", yet doesn't justify why anyone else should deserve them either.

 Although he states that "the right" (liberty) takes precedence over "the good" (socialism), his work clearly leans towards socialism and is definitely being used as propaganda in a public school course, by some sophist professor who likes feeling more important than students (and probably doesn't mind his pension, either). Just consider the original question for a moment, notice how foggy and suggestive the language is, and perhaps you'll see what I mean.

 I hope that also answers the OP's question :P.

Yeah the claim that property in the "means of production" aren't freedoms doesn't seem to have any justification either.   Of course there's a whole thread in the economics forum about how the distinction isn't exactly clear. http://board.freedomainradio.com/forums/t/34058.aspx.  Why is it that inequalities are judged only on their effect on the "least advantaged" (defined how?) and not those in the bottom 50% of advantage?  There are so many unanswered questions.

I don't think that the professor neccesary likes Rawls just because he asked a question about him.  Whether you like it or not Rawls is influential, often amoung people who have never heard of him.  Understanding him is valuable and is a legitimate subject for a philosophy course.  You don't just have to cover the GOOD philosophers.  I don't see that the question is all that suggestive of Rawls being right or wrong.  Of course it's foggy because it deals with Rawls.  He's foggy. 

 

Aelephant:

Do you actually have the book? Where does he dream these up? They seem random and there's no justification given for them.

Oh he has a "justification".  From the tome itsself:

"It seems evident that these things fit the description of primary goods (i.e. things that every rational man is presumend to want).  They are social goods in view of their connection to the basic structure; liberties and opprotunities are defined by the rules of major institutions and the distribution of income and wealth is regulated by them."

I'm not even sure where to begin.  How can a serious philosopher really say something like morality is actually defined by the major institutions of society?  How can you even question something so bold and sophisticated?

Thanks for all the help, guys.  I really appreciate your efforts in totally deconstructing Rawls' arguments in ways that I haven't even been aware of during class.  It's hard to argue against ghostly assumptions that I can't see when my quick-talking professor starts lecturing.  Should I just ask over and over about Rawls' definitions? Or his assumptions?  I don't know how to handle this class productively, not to mention respond to a question like in my OP.

huttnedu:

Thanks for all the help, guys.  I really appreciate your efforts in totally deconstructing Rawls' arguments in ways that I haven't even been aware of during class.  It's hard to argue against ghostly assumptions that I can't see when my quick-talking professor starts lecturing.  Should I just ask over and over about Rawls' definitions? Or his assumptions?  I don't know how to handle this class productively, not to mention respond to a question like in my OP.

It depends, which is more important; getting a good grade in this class or maintaining you integrity and developing your own philosophical skills. The prof is probably not going to take to kindly to you pointing out the emperor is naked... given he has all of the power, you might want to write up some BS answer that will make him happy and get you out of his class with a good grade. It is all dependent on what you want.

Well, Alex, I guess I'm still in a state of disbelief when it comes to the volatility of these ideas.

Are those really my only two options?  The dilemma you put forth struck me as catastrophic.  I know for sure that I'll bullshit this paper and essentially switch my brain into Rawlsian mode but I really want to at least help the class see the errors in this type of thinking.

The fact that Rawls assumes the virtue and necessity of government is so blatant that, as has been stated in this thread, when the emperor wears no clothes you know that everybody else is aware of it, they are just avoiding the truth.  That's the toughest part about it, they aren't just ignorant, they actively seek complex rationalizations to reduce the anxiety of questioning the status quo.

Does anybody have experience in a classroom setting like this?  I want to discover the best ways to communicate the truth which is why I am getting my degree in philosophy, I just totally underestimated the amount of fog which can be generated by just one piece of literature.