I finally got around to reading this book trying to understand what the fuss is all about and I have to confess my ADD just wouldn't allow me to get through all of it. I mean I appreciate the attempt that has been made and I'm sure there's valuble thinking in there somewhere but it is also invalid as a framework for a science of testing for objective morality.
I think, and I could be stupid and completely wrong, but this is what doesn't make any sense to me:
Self-Defeating Arguments
In order to begin our discussion of ethics, it is essential that we understand the nature of self-defeating arguments.
In economics, a theory cannot be valid if it requires that prices go up and down at the same time. In physics, a theory cannot be valid if it requires that gases expand and contract simultaneously. In mathematics, a theory cannot be valid if it requires that two plus two equals five, since “five” is just another way of describing two plus three, not two plus two, and so to say that two plus two equals five is to say that five equals four, which is self-contradictory.
In general, any theory that contradicts itself in the utterance cannot be valid. It does not require external disproof, since it disproves itself. We do not need to examine every nook and cranny in the universe to determine that a “square circle” does not exist. The very concept is self-contradictory, and thus disproves itself in the utterance.
Ok, fair enough, why then say this:
Preferences
Now that we understand the nature of self-defeating arguments, we can turn to the question of preferences.
Preferences are central to any methodology claiming to define the truth-value of propositions. The scientific method, for instance, is largely defined by innate preferences for logical consistency and empirical verification. For science, the premise is: if you want to determine a valid truth about the behaviour of matter and energy, it is preferable to use the scientific method.
In this sense, “preferable” does not mean “sort of better,” but rather “required.” If you want to live, it is universally preferable that you refrain from eating a handful of arsenic. If you wish to determine valid truths about reality, it is universally preferable that your theories be both internally consistent and empirically verifiable. “Universally preferable,” then, translates to “objectively required,” but we will retain the word “preferable” to differentiate between optional human absolutes and non-optional physical absolutes such as gravity.
Ok wait what? somehow a preference:
pref·er·ence [pref-er-uhns, pref-ruhns] Show IPA
noun
1. the act of preferring.
2. the state of being preferred.
3. that which is preferred; choice: His preference is vanilla, notchocolate.
4. a practical advantage given to one over others.
5. a prior right or claim, as to payment of dividends or to assetsupon dissolution.
has the same meaning as requirement:
re·quire·ment [ri-kwahyuhr-muhnt] Show IPA
noun
1. that which is required; a thing demanded or obligatory: Oneof the requirements of the job is accuracy.
2. an act or instance of requiring.
3. a need or necessity: to meet the requirements of daily life.
Isn't this essentially saying 2+2=5 oh and also 5=4?! What is the purpose of him saying preferences are central to any methodology claiming to define the truth-value of propositions if it's not a preference but a requirement?! To make his theory sound better? I'm supremely lost. If one wants to live it's not preferred to not eat arsenic but it is REQUIRED. If one wishes to determine valid truths about reality, it is not universally preferable that their theories be both internally consistent and empirically verifiable it is REQUIRED.
And this is how he explains his 2+2=5=4
“Universally preferable,” then, translates to “objectively required,” but we will retain the word “preferable” to differentiate between optional human absolutes and non-optional physical absolutes such as gravity.
So the reason for 2+2=5=4 is so that we can pretend that what is REQUIRED for every other methodology claiming to define the truth-value of propositions isn't merely a subjective preference when it comes defining the truth-value of propositions about human absolutes.
From his book:
The fundamental difference between statements of preference and statements of fact is that statements of fact are objective, testable – and binding.
So what's up with that?
However, if I tell him that it is moral for sons to obey their fathers, and immoral for them to disobey their fathers, then I am proposing a preference that is universal, rather than merely personal –
actually you are proposing a personal subjective preference that has an objective and universal requirement
I am trying to turn a “little truth” (I want you to become a baseball player) into a “great truth” (It is immoral for sons to disobey fathers). If he wishes to be moral, he must become a baseball player – not because becoming a baseball player is moral, but rather because obeying his father is moral.
More like “specific preference” into a "general preference" or in other words if he wants to be moral ACCORDING TO YOU it is ALWAYS REQUIRED to always obey his father.
He says so himself in the very next sentence:
When I speak of a universal preference, I am really defining what is objectively required, or necessary, assuming a particular goal.
Yeah Stef, what/who's goal? The son being moral according to his father.
Trying to convince us 5=4 some more:
If I want to live, I do not have to like jazz, but I must eat. “Eating” remains a preference – I do not have to eat, in the same way that I have to obey gravity – but “eating” is a universal, objective, and binding requirement for staying alive, since it relies on biological facts that cannot be wished away.
No, if your subjective goal is to live, it is REQUIRED to eat, not a preference. Absent this goal it becomes a subjective preference as is with living. Were you somehow trying to show us that living is universally preferable?
Ethics as a discipline can be defined as any theory regarding preferable human behaviour that is universal, objective, consistent – and binding. Naturally, preferential behaviour can only be binding if the goal is desired. If I say that it is preferable for human beings to exercise and eat well, I am not saying that human beings must not sit on the couch and eat potato chips. What I am saying is that if you want to be healthy, you should exercise and eat well.
NOT TRUE! The truth is:
Ethics as a discipline can be defined as any theory regarding REQUIRED human behaviour that is universal, objective, consistent – and binding. Naturally, REQUIRED behavior is only REQUIRED if the GOAL is desired. If I say that it is REQUIRED for human beings to exercise and eat well, I am not saying that human beings must not sit on the couch and eat potato chips. What I am saying is that IF you want to be healthy, you HAVE to exercise and eat well.
Ok now on to the crux of where the problem actually is:
Premise 4: Correction Requires Universal Preferences
If you correct me on an error that I have made, you are implicitly accepting the fact that it would be better for me to correct my error. Your preference for me to correct my error is not subjective, but objective, and universal.
You don’t say to me: “You should change your opinion to mine because I would prefer it,” but rather: “You should correct your opinion because it is objectively incorrect.” My error does not arise from merely disagreeing with you, but as a result of my deviance from an objective standard of truth. Your argument that I should correct my false opinion rests on the objective value of truth – i.e. that truth is universally preferable to error, and that truth is universally objective.
INVALID:
If you correct me on an error that I have made, you are implicitly accepting the fact that it would be better for me to correct my error. Your preference for me to correct my error is not subjective, but objective, and universal.
No, I am not implicitly accepting the fact that it would be better for you to correct your error, I'm merely displaying my subjective preference for correcting an error which just so happens to be yours. How you came to my preference for your actions where you can objectively only show my subjective preference in this conclusion is beyond me. Maybe I like correcting your errors? Maybe I like you keep making errors so I can keep correcting them?
What he tries to do with this premise 4 is to say that 2+2=5 but really it's =4 but no wait it's =5. Not that it would reveal any objective truth but he is trying to prove my subjective preference for someone else's actions where he can only prove my subjective preference for my own actions and the requirement given my desired goal. He is trying to make an argument for someone else to correct their error where he can only make an argument what is objectively required of me to correct any error if that is my subjective goal.
Because there's no objective preference for someone else's actions proven it detonates premise 6:
Premise 6: Truth Is Better Than Falsehood
If I tell you that the world is flat, and you reply that the world is not flat, but round, then you are implicitly accepting the axiom that truth and falsehood both exist objectively, and that truth is better than falsehood.
If I tell you that I like chocolate ice cream, and you tell me that you like vanilla, it is impossible to “prove” that vanilla is objectively better than chocolate. The moment that you correct me with reference to objective facts, you are accepting that objective facts exist, and that objective truth is universally preferable to subjective error.
INVALID:
Premise 6: Truth Is Better Than Falsehood
If I tell you that the world is flat, and you reply that the world is not flat, but round, then you are implicitly accepting the axiom that truth and falsehood both exist objectively, and that truth is better than falsehood.
How is truth better than falsehood exactly derived from the above argument? All we can derive from the above argument is that falsehood and truth both objectively exist, period.
The moment that you correct me with reference to objective facts, you are accepting that objective facts exist, and that objective truth is universally preferable to subjective error.
Again, how exactly have I accepted that objective truth is universally preferable to subjective error? No preference for someone else's actions of any kind in regards with truth has been established thus far other than my own subjective preference of wanting to correct errors.
Premise 7: Peaceful Debating Is The Best Way To Resolve Disputes
If I tell you that the world is flat, and you pull out a gun and shoot me, this would scarcely be an example of a productive debate. True, our disagreement would have been “resolved” – but because only one of us was left standing at the end.
If you told me in advance that you would deal with any disagreement by shooting me, I would be unlikely to engage in a debate with you. Thus it is clear that any debate relies on the implicit premise that evidence, reason, truth and objectivity are the universally preferable methods of resolving disputes between individuals. It would be completely illogical to argue that differences of opinion should be resolved through the use of violence – the only consistent argument for the value of violence is the use of violence.[4]
In essence, then, debating requires an objective methodology, through meaningful language, in the pursuit of universal truth, which is objectively preferable to personal error.
This preference for universal truth is not a preference of degree, but of kind. A shortcut that reduces your driving time by half is twice as good as a longer route – but both are infinitely preferable to driving in the completely wrong direction.
In the same way, the truth is not just “better” than error – it is infinitely preferable, or required.
INVALID:
Thus it is clear that any debate relies on the implicit premise that evidence, reason, truth and objectivity are the universally preferable methods of resolving disputes between individuals.
Not true, you haven't established universal preference for evidence, reason, truth and objectivity being universally preferable methods of resolving disputes, but that violence isn't, and this being your own subjective preference, not universal in any sense.
In essence, then, debating requires an objective methodology, through meaningful language, in the pursuit of universal truth, which is objectively preferable to personal error.
You mean debating with YOU requires..
This preference for universal truth is not a preference of degree, but of kind. A shortcut that reduces your driving time by half is twice as good as a longer route – but both are infinitely preferable to driving in the completely wrong direction.
In the same way, the truth is not just “better” than error – it is infinitely preferable, or required.
YES! If one wants to debate with YOU, the truth is not preferable but a requirement, you made that very clear.
Premise 8: Individuals Are Responsible For Their Actions
If I argue that human beings are not responsible for their actions, I am caught in a paradox, which is the question of whether or not I am responsible for my argument, and also whether or not you are responsible for your response.
If my argument that human beings are not responsible for their actions is true, then I am not responsible for my argument, and you are not responsible for your reply. However, if I believe that you are not responsible for your reply, it would make precious little sense to advance an argument – it would be exactly the same as arguing with a television set.[5]
Thus, fundamentally, if I tell you that you are not responsible for your actions, I am telling you that it is universally preferable for you to believe that preference is impossible, since if you have no control over your actions, you cannot choose a preferred state, i.e. truth over falsehood. Thus this argument, like the above arguments, self-destructs.
INVALID:
Thus, fundamentally, if I tell you that you are not responsible for your actions, I am telling you that it is universally preferable for you to believe that preference is impossible, since if you have no control over your actions, you cannot choose a preferred state, i.e. truth over falsehood. Thus this argument, like the above arguments, self-destructs.
You haven't proven that truth is preferable over falsehood.
INVALID:
Universally Preferable Behaviour
As a result of the above arguments, we can see that it is impossible to enter into any debate without accepting the premise that certain behaviours are universally preferable.
Any debate with YOU maybe.. proves nothing though.
BTW I'm not a philosopher and it could very well be that I simply didn't understand the arguments put forth, but I'm pretty good with logic and his arguments just don't make any sense to me what so ever.
I think going forward it is a mistake to try and find a theory for objective morality based on evaluation of human actions but rather on evaluation of results of human actions. Like gravity it's not really the force we care about but what are it's effects. Like with math with don't really care about formulas but their results. Like with biology we don't really care about how our body grows but that it does.
Likewise with ethics I think we shouldn't care as much why people suffer but that they do. And if suffering is objectively and universally undesired and therefor immoral, then we can work our way backwards to figure out which actions cause it and are thereby objectively and universally immoral. Just my humble suggestion that is.
p.s.: I hope I'm wrong.