Freedomain Radio

There is a friend of my family who calls herself part of the "skeptic movement" and she has written her own little self-published book entitled "The Myth of Free Will." According to her it is becoming more and more popular among the skeptics to deny the existence of free will, and her book is full of excerpts from authors, psychologists and scientists addressing the issue. Her fundamental point is that because of what we are now learning about neuroscience we can say more and more confidently that on a physical, chemical level we have very little active choice over our conscious decisions. Additionally, we know that a lot of our urges and instincts are often drilled into us in childhood. Finally broaching a conversation with her, I asked for her exact definition of Free Will, as I hadn't found that clearly established in her book; this is what she gave me: "Free Will is being able to choose something without being constrained (even a smidgen) by your genes or conditioning (past experiences)."

This is my first non-introductory post to this forum and I figured what better group could address this issue for me, as I surely do not have the philosophical training to approach the issue adequately.

My main concern is this: that because she can show that everything has a cause, that no action happens independent of prior actions, be they genetic or conditionaing experiences, that therefore no action can be said to be freely chosen without constraint. I feel like there is a big fallacy here that I'm not able to address... Everything is influenced by past actions, or even unseen forces, but does that really negate the possibility of making a choice you weren't "destined" or "programmed" to make? I believe she extrapolates her logic to praise the freedom of mind "letting go" of free will can have: to her it means you can't be blamed for the results of your current actions either, as there is a multiplicity of causes you cannot pinpoint. "constraint = lack of freedom" doesn't ring true to me, and I feel like Stef even addressed something like that recently...

To a certain extent, I'm inclined to agree with her, but feel like I'm on slippery logical footing in doing so. She finds greater freedom in her approach because it gets people out of the negative mindset that has developed from understanding everything as part of a causal universe (to a certain extent this change in mindset would influence say, one's approach to the drug war, in a positive way that libertarians couldn't object to--you can't blame addicts for their actions, and the state's aggression is immoral because it assumes causal responsibility where there is none). Is there a way to understand a lack of free will in a way that harmonizes with libertarian philosophy? Or is this simply an issue no one can really decide upon until we know the science more fully?

Hi simonides. Welcome to FDR. I hope you are doing well.

Before I begin my response, let me preface it with some important caveats. I'm not an expert in the subject of free will, nor do I have the education to come to a scientific conclusion regarding the validity of free will. I am simply a well read, often rambling, teenage philosopher dedicated to logic and empirical evidence. While I am well read, I have not have the chance to read The Myth of Free Will although it does sound interest. These factors limits my ability analyze and retort your friend’s assertions and the assertions of the scientists she cites. There are certainly others who have such an ability, and if you happen to find any scientific sources regarding the chemical or psychological aspect of the Free Will v. Determinism debate then I would love to take a look. Now that the caveats are out of the way, the following is my two cents based on.

As you mentioned, free will is a central part of morality, and moreover philosophy as a whole. It is important to understand free will, or the lack thereof, in order to be successful philosophers and to more so live happy lives.

I accept the concept of free will as valid, and thus reject the concept of determinism as invalid. By this I mean that the concept of free will accurately describes how the average, normal human being functions, and conversely that the concept of determinism does not accurate describe of the average, normal human being functions. I define free will as, “the power of making free choices unconstrained by external agencies,” (*1) and I define determinism as, “a philosophical theory holding that all events are inevitable consequences of antecedent sufficient causes; often understood as denying the possibility of free will.” (*2) Less verbose definitions of those words word be that free will is the concept that a human being can intentionally choose their actions, while determinism is the concept that human beings cannot intentionally choose their actions.

I base my respective acceptance and rejection these concepts on logical consistency with how I act (*3) and how others act.  You say in your post that, “I believe she extrapolates her logic to praise the freedom of mind ‘letting go’ of free will.” Now this is a very important assertion made my your friend which exposes how invalid her overall assertion is. As I understand her argument, she asserts that all actions are predetermined based on chemical and psychological factors out of human control. (*4) As I quoted about, your friend advocates for people to let go of their belief in free will. But in this there is an innate contradiction between what she is saying and what she is doing. She is saying that free will does not exist, but is appealing to people to intentionally reject the concept of free will, thus postulating that they have any choice in the matter of what they believe, thus contradicting her original assertion that free will does not exist.

In the lack of empirical evidence, which I have already stated I cannot comment on, any theory, such as determinism, must be logically consistent to be plausible. The innate contractions in her actions show that her theory is not logical consistent. To draw some parallels, what your friend is asserting is similar to a nihilist, who by definition rejects the concept of universal objective truth, asserting that, “There is no such thing as truth,” which is a statement of absolute objective truth. Another example would be for me to say to you that I do not exist. I think the contradiction there between what I am saying and what I am doing is quite obvious. I consider anyone that tries to prove to you that they do not exist is either ignorant, insane, or absolutely corrupt. But before I go off on a tangent, I’ll finish up.

I hope that what I have said has been of some help. Let me know if there is something I missed, if something I said was illogical, or if anything doesn't make sense. Thanks a lot!



Notes

*1     source:
        http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=free%20will

*2     source:
        http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=determinism&sub=Search+WordNet&o2=&o0=1&o7=&o5=&o1=1&o6=&o4=&o3=&h=0

*3     Excuse the use of Orwellian Newspeak here.  As Ludwig von Mises defined, “action,” in his book Human Action: A Treatise on Economics all action has to be    
        intentional and based in free will. By definition, action without intent is not action at all. By the use of the word, “act,” here and in other parts of the post, I mean
        physical movements of the human body and thoughts of the mind whether intentional or not.

*4     I agree with this in part, as it has been proven to me that both genetics and environmental factors have affects on human life and direct human action. There are
        some great resources on FDR and other places online showing that, and I refer you to them for the empirical evidence. One such source is “The Bomb in the Brain -
        The Affects of Child Abuse” by Stefan Molyneux. The play list of the four part series can be found starting here:
        http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gbiq2-ukfhM


Edit:

Fixed a grammatical mistake.

On another note, I remembered that Stefan did a series on free will and determinism. I am sure that he'll do a mucch better job at explaining it than I did. Here is a link to that series as well:
http://www.youtube.com/user/stefbot#grid/user/E2296B98EE224335

My understanding of free will is that it is at least partially, if not substantially defined as the ability to compare reality to an abstract concept in our minds, and then act accordingly.

simonides:

"Free Will is being able to choose something without being constrained (even a smidgen) by your genes or conditioning (past experiences)."

It's probably just me, but it seems to me such an assertion is self-detonating.

Was she able to make up that theory and articulate it without being constrained (even a smidgen) by her genes or conditioning (past experiences)?

 Actually, you don't even have to disprove determinism is refute what she was saying about Libertarianism. Saying that everything has a cause therefore people that do drugs or smoke or whatever aren't responsible for their choices (therefore necessitating the state) is to not apply moral reasoning consistently. Why stop at drugs? How about murder, rape, theft, fraud, etc. Why are drugs users not responsible for their addictions but murderers, rapists, and theives are not? Why not apply that same logic to everyone?

It's kinda like my same issues with angnosticism. I honestly don't care whether determinism is true it isn't going to change my moral reasoning AT ALL. I'm still going to lock up people who murder, lock up people who rape, demand resitution from people who steal, etc.  Nothing in my life is going to chance on the onset of accepting determinism. So what exactly is the vaue in accepting determinism and bringing it forth in a debate? Clearly, no one factors determinism into their moral equations; at least not in a universal or logically consistent way.

Thank you everyone, this helps a lot. It's difficult to train oneself to recognize the step-by-step logic that exposes a contradiction. Your notes were particularly interesting and helpful, RR, they give me a solid foundation. I've been flipping through Human Action and it's nice to see it referenced; I remember the part you cite, and agree. I've been meaning to  get Stef's BintheB series, just haven't gotten around to it.

Since I will have to have an in-person discussion with this woman sometime this summer, may I bring up a few more points and get your reactions? It seems like the biggest problem is she's placing too much emphasis on the past, on the collection of events that caused an action, and completely ignoring the point of intention on the part of an individual action. Given the science that might grow to complicate this whole discussion--for neuroscience really is in its infancy--her point about past actions leading to an action could possibly become valid, no? What if we develop the ability to pinpoint genetic instincts that elicit a specific reaction in a given situation? I understand I'm straying into hypotheticals and conjectures... Anyhow. The point being, our philosophy of Free Will seems healthier as it points one to the future, asking the individual to think before he acts to be sure of one's intentions, while hers would have you throw up your hands and say, "who can say for sure they know what happened yesterday, so give that murderer a break..."

As far as her book, it may sound interesting, but its really just armchair philosophy. She references some interesting folks, including Douglas Hofstadter, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Steven Pinker, a bunch of academics, but also folks like Ramesh Balsekar, Mark Twain, Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein...it's sort of a grab bag as you can see, with very short passages of original material and conclusions...

I was just flipping through it again, and here is an interesting passage, which struck a chord this second time as I'm currently halfway through UPB and was reminded of "the Null Zone." This passage appears in her chapter on "The Myth of Morality," and after establishing that "Lesson 1: morality is hardwired into us," she adds these "lessons":

2. "There are two kinds of responsibility. There is ultimate (big picture) responsibility and proximate (little picture) responsibility. Ultimately, we are not responsible for our actions because we do not have free will (for the reasons described in this book). Proxmiately, however, we are responsible and accountable for our actions. We must obey the laws of the lands we reside in and trek across. We dare not do as we please in all situations. Being held accountable teaches us to behave ethically in a civilized society. So don't worry that responsibility will vanish if we understand that free will is an illusion. In short, the proximate/ultimate distinction enables us to understand how we can be both responsible and not responsible. At first this notion befuddled me. After a while, the two kinds of responsibility settled in."

3. "The free-will myth lets us off the hook. [Following, she quotes directly Thomas W. Clark from Encountering Nationalism, which I know nothing about] "Free will is the bottom line excuse for social policies which perpetuate the cycle of crime and punishment. If we believe criminality arises from individuals' freely-willed choices, its actual biological, social and economic causes will go unexplored and unaddressed. The myth lets us off the hook. When we come to appreciate the causal story behind crime, we'll seek to prevent crime instead of punishing it after the fact. True, it is individuals who commit offenses and they must be dealt with, compassionately and effectively. But the reasons they become offenders lie in the conditions that created them, so we must hold society responsible--ourselves, our families, schools and communities, as well as the offenders--in our quest for a safe, flourishing culture."

To a certain extent I agree with Clark, until the end there when we starts collectivising like a statist. Given these bits it seems like she is approaching the issue of the Null Zone Stefan brings up, but skirts around it without logic and appeals instead to the empathetic, altruistic natures of liberals to reach a rather contradictory philosophy: "we are both responsible and not responsible." Got any problems with that? "You'll get used to it, just like I did!" 

Another big issue is that she seems to treat the neuroscience as having determined that "you have no choice, because of genetics" and doesn't address the issue of current actions affecting future genetic outcomes. That's how evolution works, right? It's not like evolution drew up all the plans right at the beginning and then pressed "execute." It's a bit messier than that as we respond to life in real time.

I'm sort of dreading broaching any of these issues with her. I'm not well trained....

Hey Simonides,

"Free will" is a concept that is too often debated without first defining what exactly "free will" is, so you ask a very smart question.

I think the fundamental problem with your family friend's conception of "free will" is the premise that in order for "will" to be "free," it must not be "caused." This seems a bit strange to me. Let me explain why...

If "free will" is to be defined as "uncaused or undetermined will" then I would have to say that it does not exist. Is the will not part and parcel of the self? Is the self not caused by my biology and sensory input? Was my biology not caused? Is my sensory input not caused? Just where does causation begin and where does it end, if it does either?

Sometimes, it seems to me anyway, that "free will" is thought of as "the freedom to choose my will," or "the freedom to choose my choices." Well, isn't this quite an odd condition? How can I choose my choices? How can I choose my will? Isn't will a necessary precondition to choice? As I see it, "freedom" does not equate to being "without causality." "Freedom" means "without compulsion or restraint." Thus, "free will" is the ability to act in accordance with one's desires, tendencies, and intentions without compulsion or restraint."

The "I" or the "self" is CREATED by a chain of caused (or determined) events. The "will," being a consequence/product of the "self" is therefore subject to causality as the deterministic chain continues. Saying that the "self" or the "will" is "causeless" does not have any practical implications whatsoever. It is simply a different conceptual identification of the source of the "self" or the "will" (or lack thereof). In other words, a change in the idea of where the "self" or the "will" derives from does not change the "self" or the "will."

Regardless of whether or not our will is determined by a chain of chemical or quantum reactions, we still make choices as individuals. So long as we possess consciousness, we are to remain as beings compelled by choice and decision. The fact that the choices we make may be "caused" does not change the fact that our selves make them willfully with respect to our knowable potentials. Determinism can in no way alter the reality of free will that each of us experiences. Something might cause me to make a certain decision, but I still decided. Make sense?

Often times, this can be a tremendous ethical concern for people. I think the central issue revolves around the perspective of whether or not personal responsibility hinges on PAP (the principle of alternative possibilities), or the ability to do otherwise. I do not think it does. If you'd like to discuss this more I am happy to.

simonides:

There is a friend of my family who calls herself part of the "skeptic movement" and she has written her own little self-published book entitled "The Myth of Free Will."

I felt some condescension in your use of the word "little" there. And maybe a little bit with the quotes around skeptic movement.

Is the book a short book?

adaywillcome: Yes, it is literally small. Less than 150 pages of content, and that widely spaced, large font, interspersed with clip art and block quotes and little boxed sidebars and stuff. It's a bit amateurish, and she does not approach the issue with the philosophical rigour you folks are supplying. From the few interactions I've had with her, I'm a little concerned she has adopted skepticism as a way of drawing attention to herself and stirring up controversy in her conversations and friendships--almost like an excuse for her demeanor, if that makes sense? I don't like judging people like this, but I always get the slight feeling of a superiority complex, though she really is very nice and sweet. I suspect she is much less objective than she makes out to be, this is why I'm timid about having any discussion with her about this, though to be honest there is a part of me that looks forward to it as well. I guess I put quotes around "skeptic movement" since I'm not sure of its precise definition, though I vaguely understand it to be growing into a more definable discourse, with some more high profile people such as the evangelical atheists like Dawkins and Sam Harris. I've been enjoying Robert Wright's books, and wonder if he would be categorized as part of the "skeptic movement."

Oneironaut: Please expand upon PAP, if you would, I'm not sure if I take your meaning. The rest of your thoughts are excellent as well, and give me lots to chew on.

In general, it's so refreshing to have so many intelligent people respond to this. I can see myself turning to this forum more and more. Instance after instance of Pope's "what oft was thought, but ne'er so well expressed."  Rare to find, these days.

I did a vid series and debate on this question that might be of interest.

We're trying to avoid the D word, a14 :)

simonides:

 "Free Will is being able to choose something without being constrained (even a smidgen) by your genes or conditioning (past experiences)."

This is a recurring topic on the forum and it is something I spent hundreds of hours on last year (studying all I could about free will and related topics.

The definition given here is not one that I have heard any libertarian put forward, ever. The word 'constrained' is rather ambiguous for a start, and the definition overall does not really capture what a libertarian account of free will is (nor any other account I know of, for that matter). I would put forward the following definition, which is pretty standard for libertarians; "free will is the ability to take more than one course of action in a particular situation". Thats really all it is.

My position on this question, so far, has been to simply take my belief as an axiom (although of course always open to new arguments) as there are not really any conclusive arguments for or against a libertarian conception of free will. It is a centuries old philosophical problem that has been attempted to be dealt with in a wide number of ways, but none particularly successful. 

A few of the common ways to try to solve the problem are attacking determinism, or redefining free will in a way that it is compatible with determinism (compatibalism) but neither actually give us any information about the fundamental question.

The history of doubt of free will is not a new thing, it has been a very common position amongst philosophers and scientists, especially since the British empiricists. Many also regarded it as a concept that came from Christianity and with the fall of Christianity (in some circles) and the rise of a mechanistic world view in Newtonian physics the idea of free will (along with many others) was discarded.

I do suggest you study the issue further because it really is interesting, although if you go in with the goal of finding a rock solid argument one way or the other, you are sure to be disappointed. You may also find that free will is rarely the issue people are really invested in in the first place; often their investment in matters of freedom are just supporting their desire to form arguments about moral responsibility. That is where the importance lies, as it would have a large effect on our lives.

For now, at least, free will is one of those questions that sits in the perpetually procrastinated 'to-do' pile of philosophy along with many of the questions and problems like Cartesian skepticism and Hume's questioning of inferential reasoning and continuity that we generally accept that there is no answer to yet we put them aside and go on living our lives despite them.

Thanks everyone! I have plenty of questions to ask now. What a can of worms; I should have known better.