Freedomain Radio

 I understand how UPB can be used as a framework to differentiate between moral claims that can be said to be true (because they are internally consistent and universally applicable) and those that are not true, and can only be subjective preferences. I'm still missing something though. I feel like there's some conclusion that is totally obvious, but that I'm for some reason blind to. Why IS morality universally preferable behavior?

rpellow:

By stealing, you imply that it is right (we all believe we are doing the right thing, even if it is delusional)

So are you saying that by acting, we implicitly make statements about what is and isn't moral?  That every time I make a decision to act, I'm stating that I believe that action is the "right" thing to do for any person, anywhere, and any time?  If so, that assertion seems to implode right away, in that it would make it wrong for anyone on the planet to not be doing exactly the same thing as me.  Otherwise, you must be saying that actions only sometimes implicitly make statements about what is and isn't moral.  What's the criteria for determining when they do and don't?  How can we be sure that the theif's act of stealing actually falls into the "moral" category?

 

GrungeGuy:

 I understand how UPB can be used as a framework to differentiate between moral claims that can be said to be true (because they are internally consistent and universally applicable) and those that are not true, and can only be subjective preferences. I'm still missing something though. I feel like there's some conclusion that is totally obvious, but that I'm for some reason blind to. Why IS morality universally preferable behavior?

What feelings come up, when you think about all those years that your parents and teachers insisted to you that "god" was morality?

What would you have preferred they tell you?

Why do you suppose they didn't tell you that?

Greg,

The first emotion that I felt when I read your first question was frustration.

The first thing that popped into my head upon reading the second question was "the truth".

I suppose that they didn't tell me that, because, although they both think and claim that they know it, they don't know it.

Allison:

rpellow:

By stealing, you imply that it is right (we all believe we are doing the right thing, even if it is delusional)

So are you saying that by acting, we implicitly make statements about what is and isn't moral?  That every time I make a decision to act, I'm stating that I believe that action is the "right" thing to do for any person, anywhere, and any time?  If so, that assertion seems to implode right away, in that it would make it wrong for anyone on the planet to not be doing exactly the same thing as me.  Otherwise, you must be saying that actions only sometimes implicitly make statements about what is and isn't moral.  What's the criteria for determining when they do and don't?  How can we be sure that the theif's act of stealing actually falls into the "moral" category?

 

By stealing, at the very least we think it is not immoral. I do think we portray our beliefs by what we do. Very few evil people admit to being evil, because they don't think what they are doing is evil. Most people, if they find out / understand they are doing evil, they will usually stop.

Our actions dont say what is true, but what we believe to be true.

rpellow:

Our actions dont say what is true, but what we believe to be true.

Sorry, I should have been more precise in my language.  That is a better way of phrasing it.  However, I still don't agree with this statement insofar as universal morality is concerned.  When I act I don't think I ever believe that my actions are something everyone, everywhere, at any time should be doing.  Switching from saying my actions indicate what I think is "moral" to "not immoral" is not a trivial change.  Saying that my actions indicate that which I believe is "not immoral" is all but meaningless, because to infer from that what I believe to be "immoral", we'd have to look at what I'm not doing, which is a list that is infinitely long.  How do we distinguish from that list the subset of things which I'm not doing because I consider them immoral, from the things that I'm not doing for other reasons (missing criteria A)?  Just because I'm not doing something at the moment, doesn't mean I consider it to be immoral.  And what about the things I'd consider immoral that I've never even imagined doing?

So really, the only way to derive any moral content from my actions is through positive statements, the problem with which I've already outlined above:

a) The assertion that actions always make positive moral statements self-destructs;

b) The assertion that actions sometimes make positive moral statements is meaningless unless you provide criteria for determining when they do vs. when they don't (missing criteria B).

So, lacking as we currently are criteria A and criteria B, all that we're left with is statements about things that we consider "not immoral" (as distinct from "moral"), which doesn't prove the existence of morality at all.

GrungeGuy:

 I think what I am missing here is a definition of the word morality.

Morality = A prescriptive statement about human behaviour and/or action. (If anyone out there sees a problem with this definition please tell me.)

Does that help at all?

Allison:

rpellow:

Our actions dont say what is true, but what we believe to be true.

Sorry, I should have been more precise in my language.  That is a better way of phrasing it.  However, I still don't agree with this statement insofar as universal morality is concerned.  When I act I don't think I ever believe that my actions are something everyone, everywhere, at any time should be doing.  Switching from saying my actions indicate what I think is "moral" to "not immoral" is not a trivial change.  Saying that my actions indicate that which I believe is "not immoral" is all but meaningless, because to infer from that what I believe to be "immoral", we'd have to look at what I'm not doing, which is a list that is infinitely long.  How do we distinguish from that list the subset of things which I'm not doing because I consider them immoral, from the things that I'm not doing for other reasons (missing criteria A)?  Just because I'm not doing something at the moment, doesn't mean I consider it to be immoral.  And what about the things I'd consider immoral that I've never even imagined doing?

So really, the only way to derive any moral content from my actions is through positive statements, the problem with which I've already outlined above:

a) The assertion that actions always make positive moral statements self-destructs;

b) The assertion that actions sometimes make positive moral statements is meaningless unless you provide criteria for determining when they do vs. when they don't (missing criteria B).

So, lacking as we currently are criteria A and criteria B, all that we're left with is statements about things that we consider "not immoral" (as distinct from "moral"), which doesn't prove the existence of morality at all.

 

I wasn't trying to prove the existence of morality, I was just trying to show the contradiction of a thief stealing something so he can keep it (and not have it stolen) And the idea that people do what they think is 'right' nobody makes the wrong choice on purpose.

rpellow:

I wasn't trying to prove the existence of morality, I was just trying to show the contradiction of a thief stealing something so he can keep it (and not have it stolen) And the idea that people do what they think is 'right' nobody makes the wrong choice on purpose.

Point taken, although I'm not sure if it invalidates my responses or not.  I feel like I'm trying to find my way through a forest in the dark with only a match and no idea of where I actually want to go, so I'm going to leave it at that for now. :)

Allison:

rpellow:

I wasn't trying to prove the existence of morality, I was just trying to show the contradiction of a thief stealing something so he can keep it (and not have it stolen) And the idea that people do what they think is 'right' nobody makes the wrong choice on purpose.

Point taken, although I'm not sure if it invalidates my responses or not.  I feel like I'm trying to find my way through a forest in the dark with only a match and no idea of where I actually want to go, so I'm going to leave it at that for now. :)

Your points i think were well taken by me anyhow, i had a poorly put together post that wasn't properly making the point that i wanted, and you ripped it apart, lol.

 Greg,

How did you feel when you saw my responses to your questions?

GrungeGuy, perhaps this simple phrasing helps:

1) One cannot correct anyone, about anything, ever, without invoking some kind of standard. Else it is simply personal preference, and you can't correct someone to personal preference. You need some kind of universal objective standard. 

Whatever standard that is, it is certainly optional, but NOT subjective. Hence, preferable (think; '...able to be preferred, universally!'). 

2) Remember that the only valid definition of morality is 'universally preferable behaviour'. It simply cannot be anything else (i.e. subjective opinion, random noises, etc!). 

If you check my blog I have a post about UPB somewhere which might help some more. 

Ok, I think this may have just become much clearer to me. Basically, a standard that is objective and universally applicable is preferable to a standard that is subjective, because it is objective and universally applicable. It's not based on whim, it's not unfair, it's not asymetrical, it's not abusive. It simply is derived from logical and empirical reality, etc. Have I got it?

GrungeGuy:

It's not based on whim, it's not unfair, it's not asymetrical, it's not abusive. It simply is derived from logical and empirical reality, etc. Have I got it?

To apply those three terms to anything, you're invoking UPB.

GrungeGuy:

Have I got it?

I'd say you're sailing pretty darn close to the mark, brother!