Freedomain Radio

I heard some of a sunday call in show, about UPB. I heard Stef dismiss a line of inquiry suggesting that to refute UPB is to engage in UPB and thus support it.

I think it is a similar line of reasoning that supports the praxeological statment, "Man acts". I have heard it supported saying that to deny it is to act, and thus support it.

Perhaps somebody has already laid claim to this, but for the moment I will call it Johnston's Law: "You will disprove Johnston's Law". If you assume it is true, the only action you can take on it is to disprove it, and thus support it. Ignoring Johnston's Law also disproves it.

I think the main flaw here is to confuse irrefuteability with truthiness. Irrefuteability means that assuming it is true causes no contradictions, like the Flying Spaghetti Monster. Irrefutability is a necessary though insufficient condition for truthiness.

PS, I am a fan of both UPB and praxeology.

His line of reasoning in the UPB book that claims that any refutation of UPB assumes UPB was, if I remember correctly, fallacious, or at best sloppily worded. Would you mind posting the basic reasoning of it here, though? For discussion's sake?

chomskyness:

Irrefutability is a necessary though insufficient condition for truthiness.

As far as your point, I think you're confusing "it's absolutely impossible for something to be otherwise" (irrefutability) with the much weaker "you can't currently disprove this" (not yet falsified, like the flying spaghetti monster). Irrefutability is a great proof of truth. Not yet being falsified is not a proof of truth at all.

Hope that helps.

From the book:

Self-Defeating Arguments

In order to begin our discussion of ethics, it is essential that we understand the nature of self-defeating arguments.

In economics, a theory cannot be valid if it requires that prices go up and down at the same time. In physics, a theory cannot be valid if it requires that gases expand and contract simultaneously. In mathematics, a theory cannot be valid if it requires that 2+2=5, since “5” is just another way of describing 2+3, not 2+2, and so to say that 2+2=5 is to say that 5=4, which is self-contradictory.

In general, any theory that contradicts itself in the utterance cannot be valid. It does not require external disproof, since it disproves itself. We do not need to examine every nook and cranny in the universe to determine that a “square circle” does not exist. The very concept is self-contradictory, and thus disproves itself in the utterance.

If I submit a complex mathematical proof to you, and you notice that, at the very beginning, I state that my proof relies on the fact that two plus two make both four and five at the same time, you do not need to read any further to know that my proof is invalid.

Similarly, as mentioned before, if I come up to you and say: “I do not exist,” my thesis automatically self-destructs. If I can communicate to you that I do not exist, then clearly I exist.

If I come up to you and say: “There is no such thing as truth,” then I am making a statement that I consider to be true claiming that truth does not exist. Again, my argument self-destructs.

If I tell you that “Language is meaningless,” then I have also contradicted myself. In order for me to verbally communicate that language is meaningless, language must have at least some meaning.

If I tell you that “Your senses are invalid,” then my argument also self-destructs, since I am using your sense of hearing to communicate to you that your sense of hearing is invalid. If I can successfully communicate my thesis to you, then your sense of hearing must be valid. Thus I must assume that your senses are valid in order to convince you that your senses are not valid, which cannot stand.

and:

Preferences and Arguments

Remembering our above analysis of self-defeating arguments, we can easily understand the contradictory nature of the statement: “preferences do not exist.” Given that every human action – including making philosophical statements – is chosen in preference to every other possible action, arguing that preferences do not exist requires a preference for arguing that preferences do not exist, which is a self-contradictory statement.

Arguing that preferences do not exist is exactly the same as arguing that language does not exist. It is an utterly self-defeating argument.

Since it is impossible to act without expressing a preference – either implicitly or explicitly – anyone who acts accepts the premise that preferences exist. Thus it is impossible to debate the existence of preferences without accepting the existence of preferences.

and:

Arguments and Universality

If I choose to debate, I have implicitly accepted a wide variety of premises that are worth spending some time to unpack here.

Premise 1: We Both Exist

If I choose to debate with you, then I necessarily must accept that we both exist. If believe that I exist, but you do not, then debating makes no sense, and would be the action of a madman. If I were to start arguing with my reflection in a mirror, I should be sedated, not debated.

Premise 2: The Senses have the Capacity for Accuracy

Since human beings cannot communicate psychically, all debates necessarily involve the evidence of the senses. Writing presupposes sight; talking requires hearing; Braille requires touch. Thus any proposition that depends upon the invalidity of the senses automatically self-destructs.

Premise 3: Language has the Capacity for Meaning

Similar to Premise 2, since all arguments require language, any proposition that rests on the premise that language is meaningless is immediately disproven. Using language to argue that language has no meaning is like using a courier to send a message arguing that couriers never deliver messages.

Premise 4: Correction Requires Universal Preferences

If you correct me on an error that I have made, you are implicitly accepting the fact that it would be better for me to correct my error. Your preference for me to correct my error is not subjective, but objective, and universal.

You don’t say to me: “You should change your opinion to mine because I would prefer it,” but rather: “You should correct your opinion because it is objectively incorrect.” My error does not arise from merely disagreeing with you, but as a result of my deviance from an objective standard of truth. Your argument that I should correct my false opinion rests on the objective value of truth – i.e. that truth is universally preferable to error, and that truth is universally objective.

Premise 5: An Objective Methodology Exists For Separating Truth From Falsehood

If you disagree with me, but I tell you that you must agree with me because I am always right, it is unlikely that you would be satisfied by the rigor of my argument. If you provided good reasons as to why I was wrong, but I just kept repeating that I was right because I am always right, our interaction could scarcely be categorized as a debate.

The moment that I provide some sort of objective criterion for determining truth from falsehood, I am accepting that truth is more than a matter of opinion.

This does not necessarily mean that my objective criteria are logical – I could refer you to a religious text, for example. However, even if I do so, I am still accepting that the truth is something that is arrived at independent of mere personal assertion – that an objective methodology exists for separating truth from falsehood.

Premise 6: Truth Is Better Than Falsehood

If I tell you that the world is flat, and you reply that the world is not flat, but round, then you are implicitly accepting the axiom that truth and falsehood both exist objectively, and that truth is better than falsehood.

If I tell you that I like chocolate ice cream, and you tell me that you like vanilla, it is impossible to “prove” that vanilla is objectively better than chocolate. The moment that you correct me with reference to objective facts, you are accepting that objective facts exist, and that objective truth is universally preferable to subjective error.

Premise 7: Peaceful Debating is the Best Way to Resolve Disputes

If I tell you that the world is flat, and you pull out a gun and shoot me, this would scarcely be an example of a productive debate. True, our disagreement would have been “resolved” – but because only one of us was left standing at the end.

If you told me in advance that you would deal with any disagreement by shooting me, I would be unlikely to engage in a debate with you.

Thus it is clear that any debate relies on the implicit premise that evidence, reason, truth and objectivity are the universally preferable methods of resolving disputes between individuals. It would be completely illogical to argue that differences of opinion should be resolved through the use of violence – the only consistent argument for the value of violence is the use of violence. (It will be useful to keep this particular premise in mind, since it will be very important later on.)

In essence, then, debating requires an objective methodology, through meaningful language, in the pursuit of universal truth, which is objectively preferable to personal error.

This preference for universal truth is not a preference of degree, but of kind. A shortcut that reduces your driving time by half is twice as good as a longer route – but both are infinitely preferable to driving in the completely wrong direction.

In the same way, the truth is not just “better” than error – it is infinitely preferable, or required.

Premise 8: Individuals are Responsible for their Actions

If I argue that human beings are not responsible for their actions, I am caught in a paradox, which is the question of whether or not I am responsible for my argument, and also whether or not you are responsible for your response.

If my argument that human beings are not responsible for their actions is true, then I am not responsible for my argument, and you are not responsible for your reply. However, if I believe that you are not responsible for your reply, it would make precious little sense to advance an argument – it would be exactly the same as arguing with a television set. (The question of responsibility is, of course, closely related to the question of free will versus determinism, which will be the subject of another book.)

Thus, fundamentally, if I tell you that you are not responsible for your actions, I am telling you that it is universally preferable for you to believe that preference is impossible, since if you have no control over your actions, you cannot choose a preferred state, i.e. truth over falsehood. Thus this argument, like the above arguments, self-destructs.

That should just about cover it.

Thanks for that Greg, I see the logical leap being made very clearly now. It's Premise 4 in the "Arguments and Universality" part.

Polly:

Thanks for that Greg, I see the logical leap being made very clearly now. It's Premise 4 in the "Arguments and Universality" part.

Wait, hang on. Why is that wrong?

Well, it doesn't logically follow from any of the other premises and he didn't really give anything close to a syllogistic proof...at least, not that I could tell. Are you capable of taking the words in premise 4 and rearranging them into the syllogistic format? I'm not, but I'd be more than willing to admit my mistake if you can.

Polly:

Well, it doesn't logically follow from any of the other premises and he didn't really give anything close to a syllogistic proof...at least, not that I could tell. Are you capable of taking the words in premise 4 and rearranging them into the syllogistic format? I'm not, but I'd be more than willing to admit my mistake if you can.

If you're incapable of reconstructing it syllogistically, then how do you even know that it's wrong?

I ended my message with "I'd be more than willing to admit my mistake if you can." This is where you show me I'm wrong. That was your invitation. If I'm willing to admit I'm wrong, it would seem to me that it's implied that I don't "know" that I'm right.

But I find this to be a diversion. The question at hand is, is premise 4 logically supported or not? My answer is: I think not, as there was no clear syllogism provided. If your answer is different, I invite you to explain why.

Polly:

I ended my message with "I'd be more than willing to admit my mistake if you can." This is where you show me I'm wrong. That was your invitation. If I'm willing to admit I'm wrong, it would seem to me that it's implied that I don't "know" that I'm right.

But I find this to be a diversion. The question at hand is, is premise 4 logically supported or not? My answer is: I think not, as there was no clear syllogism provided. If your answer is different, I invite you to explain why.

No, that's OK, I'm really not willing to do your work for you.  You've said that it's wrong, but you've not clearly identified what it is that is wrong.  I mean, there's something that you're seeing that is incorrect, but you won't tell us what it is.

It would be much more helpful for everyone else if you did point out what was wrong, even if it wasn't formally stated.  However, you're refusing to do that, which is also fine.  It just demonstrates your goal, which does not appear to be the truth.

As for a clear syllogism not being provided, that stands for all the premises given, so I also don't understand why you've picked out Premise 4 as requiring one but not for the other 7.

Furthermore, syllogisms only apply to arguments, not premises.  If there's a solid reason to not accept the premise, then give it.

Polly:

Thanks for that Greg, I see the logical leap being made very clearly now. It's Premise 4 in the "Arguments and Universality" part.

Yeah, I also got stuck on 4. The logic provided is not really sufficient as provided, I'd like to see it reformulated into an actual proof as well.

JamesP:

If there's a solid reason to not accept the premise, then give it.

This response doesn't seem very rational to me. A solid reason to not accept it is the very fact that there's no solid reason to accept it. I mean, we reject God on that basis -- we assume that the idea that God exists is false, and that the burden of proof is on the people making the claim. Why here would you change the standards? Why here do we by default assume that Stef is correct without any solid reason to accept it? Why is the burden of proof on the people who don't accept the claim? I don't think the burden of proof works like that.

I mean, if the only response Polly's getting from you is "Well you can't prove it's wrong," doesn't sound like there's actually any substantial support for it. That's the kind of response you'd expect from someone who can't defend their claim. Makes it sound a bit...religious.

Also, the idea that just because he called it a premise, it doesn't need any support is strange. I mean, we can just call the statement "God exists" a premise and suddenly no evidence or logic is needed to support it, right? Wrong. Just calling something a premise doens't negate the need for support.

Polly:

My answer is: I think not, as there was no clear syllogism provided. If your answer is different, I invite you to explain why.

Mr. C:

Can you justify syllogistically that us not providing you a clear syllogism gives you justification to claim that we're wrong?

I think you'll find she didn't say you're wrong, merely that a logical leap was made.

kremlin:

JamesP:

If there's a solid reason to not accept the premise, then give it.

This response doesn't seem very rational to me. A solid reason to not accept it is the very fact that there's no solid reason to accept it. I mean, we reject God on that basis -- we assume that the idea that God exists is false, and that the burden of proof is on the people making the claim. Why here would you change the standards? Why here do we by default assume that Stef is correct without any solid reason to accept it? Why is the burden of proof on the people who don't accept the claim? I don't think the burden of proof works like that.

I mean, if the only response Polly's getting from you is "Well you can't prove it's wrong," doesn't sound like there's actually any substantial support for it. That's the kind of response you'd expect from someone who can't defend their claim. Makes it sound a bit...religious.

So, here's how to proceed: stop with "it seems like..." and "it sounds like...".  Those aren't arguments.  They're not even good criticisms.

Here's the problem that both you and Polly are skipping over: each premise is accompanied with an explanation of how not accepting the premise results in self-detonating statements.  The way to demonstrate that these premises are invalid is to show how not accepting the premise does not result in a self-detonating statement, or possibly, that it's not a binary proposition.

You don't have to do this, of course.  But if you say it's wrong, and I'm not seeing how it's wrong, and you refuse to tell me why, but instead say stuff like "This response doesn't seem rational" or "Makes it sound a bit...religious"...  well, you're just spouting foggy hypercritical nonsense.  It's not in the service of truth that you make these accusations.